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   A Business Ecosystem Perspective of Supply Chain Justice Practices: A Study of a 
Marina Resort Supply Chain Ecosystem in Indonesia 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: 
We investigate the influence of supply chain (SC) justice practices in a shared value-supplier 
delivery performance relationship and the contingent role of trust within SC ecosystem 
operation. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: 
We collect and analyze dyadic survey data from a marina resort SC ecosystem in Indonesia.  
 
Findings: 
The results suggest the differential moderating effects of two types of perceived SC justice – 
perceived procedural justice and perceived interactional justice – on the relation between 
shared value and supplier delivery performance. More specifically, we find that perceived 
procedural justice strengthens the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship, but 
that perceived interactional justice weakens such relationship. Furthermore, our findings 
demonstrate a positive three-way interaction effect between shared value, perceived SC justice, 
and trust on supplier delivery performance. 
 
Originality/value: 
Our study is the first to introduce the role of SC justice practices in SC ecosystem operation. 
We examine how shared value interacts with perceived SC justice and trust in order to 
determine supplier delivery performance.  
 
Keywords: Business ecosystem, Shared value; Trust; Justice; Supply chain management; 
Tourism resort. 
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Introduction 
A supply chain (SC) ecosystem is a network of interconnected SC firms that share 
common values and depend on each another for their survival (Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016; 
Viswanadham and Samvedi, 2013). Unlike typical interfirm SC networks, an SC ecosystem 
involves a “hub-firm” and a community of SC firms (actor-firms or suppliers) that work 
together to build a sustainable competitive advantage (Azzam et al., 2017; Viswanadham and 
Samvedi, 2013). According to the business ecosystem literature, a hub-firm plays an important 
role in orchestrating the SC activities within the SC ecosystem (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; 
Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Despite the emphasis on the role of the hub-firm as the SC ecosystem 
orchestrator, few researchers have studied empirically the orchestration mechanisms that a hub-
firm adopts to coordinate its SC ecosystem activities (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Jacobides et 
al., 2018). The current research is an attempt to improve our understanding of how a hub-firm 
can adopt SC justice practices to orchestrate SC activities in a way that affects the shared value-
supplier delivery performance relationship and the contingent role of trust in this situation.  
Shared value reflects the development of a common understanding among the SC firms 
within an SC ecosystem (Pera et al., 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011). A major premise of the 
business ecosystem research holds that the cooperation within the SC ecosystem reflects the 
extent to which the actor-firms share each other’s thought processes and ways of doing things 
to optimize and speed up the production and delivery of the components of the ecosystem-
based products (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Liu and Rong, 2015). Hence, the presence of high 
levels of shared value within an SC ecosystem can increase the actor-firms’ (suppliers’) 
delivery performance.  
Concurrently, the manner of orchestrating the SC activities within an SC ecosystem can 
influence the levels of shared value (Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
When the actor-firms dislike the style of orchestration of the SC activities, they become less 
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willing to work in partnership with both the hub-firm and each other (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; 
Liu and Rong, 2015). As a result, the number and frequency of the interactions between the 
actor-firms and the hub-firm will decrease, which in turn will destroy the shared value. When 
the actor-firms approve of the style of orchestration of the SC activities, they become more 
willing to team up with both the hub-firm and each other. Consequently, the number and 
frequency of the interactions between the actor-firms and the hub-firm will increase, which in 
turn will generate shared value (Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011). Thus, the 
orchestration mechanisms that a hub-firm adopts in order to coordinate the SC activities can 
affect the strength of the relationship between the shared value and supplier delivery 
performance.  
We propose that a hub-firm’s adoption of SC justice practices (Narasimhan et al., 2013) 
to orchestrate the SC activities can influence the creation of shared value, which in turn 
enhances the supplier delivery performance within the SC ecosystem. More specifically, we 
seek to deepen our understanding of the various types of SC justice practices that moderate the 
relationship between shared value and supplier delivery performance. The empirical research 
to date, however, has failed to examine the role of SC justice practices within SC ecosystem 
operation. Yet, as anecdotal evidence suggests, suppliers’ (actor-firms’) fairness perceptions 
toward a hub-firm may affect their willingness to continue collaborating with both the hub-
firm and each other with regards to SC activities (Katok and Pavlov, 2013; Narasimhan et al., 
2013). Furthermore, previous studies of the justice practices in individuals (e.g., Colquitt et al., 
2012) and firms’ (e.g., Jambulingam et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2011) relationships typically 
conceptualize the role of “trust” in order to help to capitalize the value of the justice practices. 
The issue of how trust within an SC ecosystem affects a hub-firm’s SC justice practices remains 
under-examined. Together, these insights are critical for the managers who are in charge of 
leveraging multiple tactics to orchestrate the SC activities within the SC ecosystem.   
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Drawing on the insights of business ecosystem research (Liu and Rong, 2015; Rong et 
al., 2015), we develop a framework (see Figure 1). We test this framework by collecting and 
analyzing dyadic survey data from a marina resort SC ecosystem in Indonesia. We aim to make 
two important contributions to the relevant literature. First, ours is the first study to examine 
how perceived SC justice affects shared value-supplier delivery performance within an SC 
ecosystem. In doing so, we contribute to the business ecosystem research that investigates how 
a hub-firm adopts different mechanisms to orchestrate the SC activities within an SC ecosystem 
(e.g., Azzam et al., 2017; Rong et al., 2013). Second, by investigating how trust within an SC 
ecosystem affects the moderating effect of perceived SC justice on the shared value-supplier 
delivery performance relationship, we provide a more nuanced understanding about the 
contingent role of trust in the business ecosystem research (e.g., Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; 
Liu and Rong, 2015).  
Theoretical Background 
A Hub-Firm and an SC Ecosystem 
Jacobides et al. (2018) divide the business ecosystem research into three different 
streams. The first stream views the business ecosystem as a group of interacting firms that 
revolve around a hub-firm and work together to build a sustainable competitive advantage (e.g., 
Ansari et al., 2016; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). The second stream views a business ecosystem 
as an innovative network in which firms interact with one another to engage in product 
innovation-related activities (e.g., Adner, 2006; Adner and Kapoor, 2010). The third stream 
views a business ecosystem as a group of interdependent firms that gather around “platform” 
technologies that connect the firms and allow them to share or gain access to open-source 
technologies and technical standards (e.g., Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Gawer and Cusumano, 
2014). Our research on the SC ecosystem is more in line with the first stream of research, which 
5 
 
emphasizes the formation of interconnected business networks in order to engage in SC 
operations. 
Under this business ecosystem perspective, previous research suggests that a hub-firm 
plays an important role in coordinating the SC activities within an SC ecosystem (e.g., Ansari 
et al., 2016; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). With few exceptions (e.g., Pellinen et al., 2012; Pera et 
al., 2016), little research attention has focused on the orchestration mechanisms that enable a 
hub-firm to coordinate the SC activities within an SC ecosystem. For example, Rong et al. 
(2013) conduct case studies of several hub-firms (such as Tecent, TSMC, Wistron, etc.) in the 
mobile computing industry and identify the three-step process (adjustment, adoption, and 
convergence) that they have used to nurture the operation of an SC ecosystem and deal with 
industry-related uncertainties. Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) propose that a hub-firm should 
adopt an orchestration mechanism to ensure the presence of knowledge mobility, innovation 
appropriability, and network stability within an SC ecosystem. Azzam et al. (2017) suggest the 
use of patents to orchestrate the ecosystem and ensure its stability. Against this background, 
our study marks an attempt to extend this line of research by proposing that a hub-firm can 
adopt SC justice practices as orchestration mechanisms. No prior studies have attempted to 
explore the influence of SC justice practices among the firms within an SC ecosystem. We also 
take a step further to investigate the role of trust as a contingent factor that moderates the 
impacts of SC justice practices. Together, this study aims to improve our understanding of the 
role of SC justice practices to coordinate the SC activities within an SC ecosystem. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Constructs 
 We anchor our study in the business ecosystem research, which highlights that the 
formation of an SC ecosystem requires the actor-firms (suppliers) to develop a shared value 
that allows them to revolve around a hub-firm and collaborate with each other in combating 
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uncertainty and exploiting business opportunities (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Jacobides et al., 
2018; Porter and Kramer, 2011). In accordance with this premise, the business ecosystem 
research expects a hub-firm to play a critical role in orchestrating the SC operations within the 
ecosystem and the actor-firms to focus on delivering the components of ecosystem-based 
products (Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Rong et al., 2015). In this situation, a hub-firm’s SC justice 
practices in dealing with its actor-firms during their interactions are important in affecting the 
dynamics of the actor-firms’ behaviors within SC operation. This perspective builds on prior 
studies that suggest that unfair dealings in SC operation by the hub-firm can trigger the actor-
firms’ (suppliers’) retaliation, thus undermining the collaborative behaviors (e.g., Caliskan-
Demirag et al., 2010). Prior work on the business ecosystem research also emphasizes the 
critical role of trust in facilitating collaboration within an SC ecosystem (Azzam et al., 2017; 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Liu and Rong, 2015). Drawing on the insights of business 
ecosystem research, we develop a framework (see Figure 1). We elaborate on the central 
constructs of our framework and the underpinning theoretical rationales below. 
“Insert Figure 1” 
We conceptualize supplier delivery performance as the dependent variable of this study. 
This conceptualization builds on the business ecosystem research, which has found that the 
actor-firms’ (suppliers’) ability to deliver their promise made to the hub-firm represents the 
ultimate consequences of the hub-firm’s efforts to orchestrate the ecosystem-based activities 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Rong et al., 2015). The literature has generally characterized a firm’s 
delivery performance in terms of its delivery speed and reliability (Malhotra and Mackelprang, 
2012; Milgate, 2001). Delivery speed reflects the timeliness of a firm’s responsiveness to 
perform an activity or fill an order, while delivery reliability relates to the capacity of the firm 
to fulfill the delivery as promised (Milgate, 2001). We define supplier delivery performance as 
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the extent to which the actor-firms are able to provide the dependable, timely delivery of the 
product components to the hub-firm.     
In addition, we conceptualize shared value as the independent variable in our 
framework, again building on the business ecosystem research. From the business ecosystem 
perspective, shared value reflects the development of a common understanding and 
interpretation of the world among SC firms, which motivates the suppliers to work together 
within the SC ecosystem (Pera et al., 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011). When the actor-firms 
share each other’s thinking processes, they can embed generally acceptable approaches in order 
to optimize the delivery of the components of the ecosystem-based products (Adner and 
Kapoor, 2010; Liu and Rong, 2015; Saparito and Coombs, 2013). We define shared value as a 
common understanding among a hub-firm and the actor-firms (suppliers) within an SC 
ecosystem relationship.  
Drawing on the business ecosystem research, we conceptualize perceived SC justice as 
the moderating variable in the relationship between shared value and supplier delivery 
performance. Previous research on the business ecosystem indicates that a hub-firm’s 
behaviors and its dealings with the actor-firms can affect the nature of the collaborative 
behaviors within the SC ecosystem (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). We 
focus on a hub-firm’s SC justice practices (i.e., fairness behaviors). In practice, the presence of 
perceived SC justice by an actor-firm may affect how it interacts with a hub-firm to develop a 
common understanding (shared value) between them and how they deliver their promised 
performance because the norm of reciprocity influences an actor-firm. We focus on an actor-
firm’s (supplier’s) perception of two specific dimensions of SC justice practices1 engaged in 
by the hub-firm. We define perceived procedural justice as the perceived fairness of the 
                                                 
1 Distributive justice is another main form of SC justice practice, which is defined as the perceived fairness of rewards commensurate with the 
effort expended (Griffith et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 2013). It exists when the more powerful partner realizes that it has the reward power 
to determine how to share any benefits. In the context of our study, whether or not a hub-firm holds such reward power is unknown, so we 
decide not to investigate the influence of distributive justice. 
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decisions that the hub-firm takes with regards to its SC activities, and perceived interactional 
justice as the perceived fairness of the hub-firm in communicating information related to its 
SC activities (Luo, 2007; Narasimhan et al., 2013).  
 Finally, we conceptualize trust as a moderating variable that influences the moderating 
effects of perceived SC justice on the shared value-supplier delivery performance association. 
Prior research on interpersonal relationships has emphasized the important role of trust in 
shaping the perceptions of a party’s intention to engage in fair/unfair treatment (Bal et al., 2011; 
De Cremer and Tyler, 2007). The current study applies this logic to explain the moderating 
effects of trust and perceived justice within the SC ecosystem relationship. This consideration 
builds on the prior research that applied concepts – explicitly trust and perceived justice – that 
researchers originally used to describe the content of the interpersonal relationship in order to 
explain the dynamics of the behaviors in firms’ relationships (Narasimhan et al., 2013; Saparito 
and Coombs, 2013). Previous studies of the business ecosystem have emphasized the role of 
trust in facilitating the dynamics of firms’ behaviors within an SC ecosystem (Azzam et al., 
2017; Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Liu and Rong, 2015). We define trust as a confident, positive 
expectation regarding the SC exchange partners’ conduct, motives, and intentions in situations 
entailing risk. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
The Perception of a Hub-Firm’s Justice Practices  
According to the business ecosystem research, shared value guides how the actor-firms 
respond to the demands of a hub-firm and deliver the components of ecosystem-based products 
that meet the hub-firm’s requirements (Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016; Viswanadham and Samvedi, 
2013). We apply these insights to analyze the association between shared value and supplier 
delivery performance. First, shared value enhances the relationship commitment between a 
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hub-firm and the actor-firms within an SC ecosystem. Having high levels of shared value 
within an SC ecosystem means that a hub-firm and its actor-firms (suppliers) “have beliefs in 
common about what behaviors, goals, and policies are important or unimportant, appropriate 
or inappropriate and right or wrong” (Morgan and Hunt, 1994, p. 25). This allows a hub-firm 
and its actor-firms to develop strong mutual attachments and feel confident that their 
relationships are important (Porter and Kramer, 2011). When the actor-firms believe that their 
relationships with the hub-firms are sufficiently important to warrant the exertion of the 
maximum efforts to maintain it, they will be more likely to provide the dependable and timely 
delivery of various product components to the hub-firms. 
Second, shared value mitigates the competitive tensions among the actor-firms within 
an SC ecosystem (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016). As high levels of 
shared value facilitate learning and knowledge transfer activities within the SC ecosystem 
(Saparito and Coombs, 2013), the actor-firms are more likely to share each other’s thinking 
processes and develop a cohesive view about the external challenges faced by the SC 
ecosystem as a whole. This helps them to recognize that collaborative behaviors can enhance 
their joint competitive position in the marketplace (Kramer and Pfitzer, 2016; Porter and 
Kramer, 2011). As a result, the actor-firms (suppliers) are more likely to ensure that they fulfil 
the delivery of the product components to the hub-firm as promised and on time. Combining 
the above two reasons, having high levels of shared value with the SC ecosystem can have 
beneficial effects on supplier delivery performance.   
 Unlike a formal contract, where both parties agree on their obligations and 
responsibilities during the length of the exchange relationship, shared value represents an 
informal arrangement that governs the parties’ behaviors throughout the exchange relationship 
(Saparito and Coombs, 2013). As a result, the levels of shared value may vary during the period 
of the exchange relationship, and various factors may influence it. According to the business 
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ecosystem research, the mechanisms that a hub-firm adopts to orchestrate the SC activities can 
affect how the actor-firms interact with both the hub-firms and each other (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 
2006; Rong et al., 2013), which in turn can affect the level of shared value within the SC 
ecosystem by amplifying/suppressing the activities that generate shared value (Kramer and 
Pfitzer, 2016; Porter and Kramer, 2011). We apply these insights to argue that the hub-firm 
adopts various SC justice practices as orchestration mechanisms to coordinate the SC activities 
within an SC ecosystem, which can influence the impacts of the shared value on supplier 
delivery performance. Because the perception that a hub-firm behaves in a just manner in 
orchestrating the SC operations by an actor-firm (supplier) can  influence its decision regarding 
whether to continue/stop participating in interaction activities with the hub-firm and other 
actor-firms, which in turn may amplify/suppress the activities that create shared value (Griffith 
et al., 2006; Narasimhan et al., 2013).  
 Specifically, the presence of perceived procedural justice leads the actor-firms 
(suppliers) to develop a desire to collaborate with the hub-firm in the long-run. When the actor-
firms perceive that the procedures that a hub-firm has adopted to make decisions related to SC 
activities are fair, they are more likely to consider the hub-firm as a credible and consistent 
exchange partner in the SC ecosystem (Griffith et al., 2006). This will increase the actor-firms’ 
willingness to interact with the hub-firm, as they believe that this SC relationship is worth 
making efforts to maintain. Furthermore, an actor-firm’s perception of a hub-firm’s procedural 
justice practices also enhances the interaction between the actor-firm and the other actor-firms 
within the hub-firm ecosystem. Within the SC ecosystem, actor-firms not only cooperate but 
also compete with each other (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). The presence of procedural justice 
represents the existence of fair procedures for orchestrating SC activities by the hub-firm. This 
will enhance the actor-firms’ willingness to interact with one another because such fairness 
procedures guarantee the protection of the interests of each actor-firm (Scott and Laws, 2006).  
11 
 
 Likewise, the presence of perceived interactional justice creates an environment in 
which information can flow freely among firms (both the hub-firm and the actor-firms) within 
an SC ecosystem (Luo, 2007; Scott and Laws, 2006). When the actor-firms perceive the process 
of communicating SC activities-related information within the SC ecosystem to be fair, they 
become more open about sharing their information with both the hub-firm and each other. This 
openness about sharing information within the SC ecosystem enables all of the firms to extract 
more value from their relationship. Because they are now able to access important information 
about the SC operation, and take appropriate actions to respond to it accordingly (Luo, 2007). 
In such a situation, all firms within the SC ecosystem become more willing to interact with one 
another and ensure the sharing of information among them.  
In summary, the presence of either perceived procedural justice or perceived 
interactional justice can stimulate a greater number of and more frequent interactions 1) 
between the actor-firms and the hub-firm and 2) among the actor-firms within an SC ecosystem. 
More and frequent interactions among SC firms increase the likelihood of them developing a 
common understanding that will help them to interpret the world around them (Saparito and 
Coombs, 2013). That is, the existence of either type of SC justice practices perceived by the 
SC firms can help to facilitate ecosystem-wide interaction activities, which in turn generate 
shared value within the SC ecosystem. As we argued previously, the presence of high levels of 
shared value within the SC ecosystem can have beneficial effects on the supplier delivery 
performance. Under the condition where either perceived procedural justice or perceived 
interactional justice is present, the strength of the relationship between shared value and 
supplier delivery performance is likely to be stronger. Because the levels of shared value among 
SC firms are high when they perceive that either type of justice practices exists within the SC 
ecosystem.  
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Hypothesis 1: In the context of an SC ecosystem, perceived procedural justice 
strengthens the positive relationship between shared value and supplier delivery 
performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In the context of an SC ecosystem, perceived interactional justice 
strengthens the positive relationship between shared value and supplier delivery 
performance. 
 
 
The Moderating Role of Trust 
 Prior research on business ecosystems has highlighted the critical role of trust in 
facilitating collaborative behaviors and dealing with conflict situations among firms in their 
business relationship (Azzam et al., 2017; Liu and Rong, 2015). Sitkin and Pablo (1992) 
suggest that trust can pertain to one party’s beliefs and expectations about another party’s 
intention regarding their interaction. When considering the actor-firm’s perception of trust 
within an SC ecosystem and a hub-firm’s justice practices together, scholars suggest that, if 
one party has a high-level of trust, it will tend to attribute unfair treatment to unfortunate 
circumstances rather than to the deliberate intention of another party (Bal et al., 2011; De 
Cremer and Tyler, 2007). We apply these insights to argue for a three-way interaction effect, 
consisting of shared value, perceived justice, and trust, on supplier delivery performance. 
 Although perceived procedural justice reflects the actor-firms’ (suppliers’) belief that 
the hub-firm has adopted a fair process for making decisions associated with the SC activities, 
this does not mean that the actor-firms always welcome the decisions made by the hub-firm. 
Because there is no perfect decision-making mechanism that can address everyone’s needs and 
make them feel that the results are completely fair, especially when these decisions involve a 
huge number of interested parties (Katok and Pavlov, 2013). When the level of trust within the 
relationship is low, some actor-firms, who find the hub-firm’s decisions unfavorable toward 
them, may consider that the hub-firm has intentionally taken advantage of them (Czernek and 
Czakon, 2016). Thus, this weakens the actor-firms’ perception of a hub-firm’s procedural 
justice practices, and they become less willing to continue interacting with the hub-firm. 
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Furthermore, these actor-firms may also consider other actor-firms who have received 
favorable treatment, due to the hub-firm’s adoption of an unfair decision-making process, as 
potential competitors within the SC ecosystem (Czernek and Czakon, 2016). Under both 
circumstances, the overall number and frequency of the interactions between the hub-firm and 
the actor-firms, as well as among the actor-firms themselves, diminish which, in turn, rescinds 
the shared value and suppresses its effects.  
On the other hand, when the level of trust is high within an SC ecosystem, the actor-
firms will attribute these unwelcome decisions to unfortunate circumstances (Beritelli, 2011; 
Czakon and Czernek, 2016). Because the actor-firms believe that the hub-firm intends to make 
fair decisions regarding the SC activities. As a result, the actor-firms will remain willing to 
interact with both the hub-firm and each other and continue to generate shared value. Briefly, 
increases in the level of trust within the SC ecosystem enhance the beneficial effect of 
perceived procedural justice on the link between shared value (between the hub-firm and the 
actor-firms, as well as among the actor-firms themselves) and supplier delivery performance.  
Hypothesis 3: In the context of an SC ecosystem, the positive moderating effect of 
perceived procedural justice on the shared value-supplier delivery performance 
relationship is stronger (weaker) when the level of trust in the supply chain 
relationship is high (low). 
 
Similarly, we expect that the positive moderating role of perceived interactional justice 
on the shared value-supplier delivery performance may be enhanced when the trust level is 
high. As argued previously, the presence of interactional justice promotes openness and allows 
information to flow freely within an SC ecosystem. While transferring information among SC 
firms within the SC ecosystem may result in better communication, it is also possible that a 
greater information flow may increase the chance of opportunity inequality that could 
jeopardize the future of the SC relationship, because information is only useful for the SC firms 
when they have the capability to make sense out of the raw data and also the resources to act 
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on it (Möller, 2010). Firms within the SC ecosystem have varying abilities and resources. In 
the situation where information flows freely among the firms within an SC ecosystem, SC firms 
that have superior abilities and more resources are in a better position to translate information 
into actions to exploit business opportunities, and vice versa. SC firms that are less able to 
benefit from this situation may become less willing to collaborate with the hub-firm and each 
other or, even worse, start collaborating with other firms in the competing SC ecosystem. 
We expect that this challenge will be eased when the level of trust within the SC 
relationship is high. When the trust level is high, the actor-firms (suppliers) tend to interpret 
such opportunity inequality as an unfortunate event rather than as being due to the deliberate 
intention of the other firms to take advantage of the openness of the SC ecosystem. They 
believe that selected firms that are able to translate the accessed information into business 
opportunities (e.g., the development of new products) will ultimately share their benefits (e.g., 
ask other firms to manufacture the new products) with all of the firms within that SC ecosystem 
(Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Liu and Rong, 2015).  As a result, the actor-firms will continue 
to interact with both the hub-firm and each other, which in turn leads to the development of 
shared value within an SC ecosystem. Thus, the positive effect of perceived interaction justice 
on the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship will be amplified when the level 
of trust is high.  
On the other hand, when the level of trust is low, the actor-firms are more likely to 
interpret opportunity inequality as other firms’ deliberate action and so take retaliatory action 
in response to this. Consequently, the actor-firms will become less likely to engage in 
interaction activities with both the hub-firm and each other. Such actions will destroy the shared 
value within the SC ecosystem and reduce the effect of perceived interactional justice in 
strengthening the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship. Combining the 
above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 4: In the context of an SC ecosystem, the positive moderating effect of 
perceived interactional justice on the shared value-supplier delivery performance 
relationship is stronger (weaker) when the level of trust in the supply chain 
relationship is high (low). 
 
Research Method 
Empirical Context – Tourism Resort SC Ecosystem in Indonesia 
 A tourism resort is a commercial establishment that provides an array of amenities to 
customers in a single, contained place. It does not operate in isolation but rather within an SC 
ecosystem that forms around a community of different SC suppliers (Rusko et al., 2009). The 
final products that a tourism resort offers consist of two unique features: 1) they are complex 
in nature, consisting of various tangible and intangible components (such as food, 
transportation, entertainment, etc.), and 2) they are perishable and cannot be stored for future 
use (Zhang and Murphy, 2009). In order to assemble a final product offer at the point of 
consumption, a tourism resort often relies on inputs from its SC ecosystem rather than in-house 
production (Rusko et al., 2009; Zhang and Murphy, 2009). The focal firm does not own or 
control these suppliers. A tourism resort operates as a hub-firm in the SC ecosystem by 
orchestrating the assembly of the final product offers. Thus, a tourism resort SC ecosystem is 
a particularly appropriate setting in which to explore our research question. 
 Tourism industry in Indonesia provides a rich context for this empirical study. Tourism 
is a highly prioritized industry sector in Indonesia, with the highest sector growth rate. The 
total contribution of travel and tourism to Indonesia's GDP in 2016 was IDR 770,310bn (USD 
57.9bn), constituting 6.2% of the total GDP. By the end of 2019, the Indonesian government 
ambitiously aims to achieve a contribution of 8% to GDP, with around 20 million visitors 
(Indonesia Investments, 2016). We selected an Indonesia-based tourism resort SC ecosystem 
(due to confidentiality issues, we will call it Resort XYZ) as our sample frame for the following 
reasons. First, Resort XYZ is one of the largest integrated beach recreation and marina resort 
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complexes in Indonesia, so, it provides some degree of generalizability (Hair et al., 2010). 
Second, Resort XYZ offers various attractions, including beaches, a theme-park, water-park, 
ocean-park, ecological park, golf court, and art market. Resort XYZ also offers food, beverages, 
and merchandise, as well as sea trips to nearby islands for its guests. In order to provide visitors 
with a satisfactory experience, Resort XYZ orchestrates SC activities among 1200 suppliers 
and ensures that they provide dependable and timely delivered product components for it to 
bundle together as a final package for visitors. This setting of Resort XYZ and its community 
of suppliers is in line with the description of an SC ecosystem - a network of interconnected 
SCs that revolve around a “hub-firm” and work together to deliver ecosystem-based products 
(Liu and Rong, 2015; Viswanadham and Samvedi, 2013). 
 
Measurement and Data Collection 
 We collected dyadic responses from Resort XYZ and its suppliers. The “supplier survey” 
(a questionnaire that different suppliers of Resort XYZ completed) includes variables such as 
shared value, perceived procedural justice, perceived interactional justice, and trust, as well as 
control variables. For shared value, we adopted and modified the measurement items from 
Saparito and Coombs (2013) to assess the suppliers’ perceptions of the level of common 
understanding between themselves and Resort XYZ. We adopted and modified perceived 
procedural justice (the perceived fairness with which Resort XYZ takes SC activities-related 
decisions) and perceived interactional justice (the perceived fairness with which Resort XYZ 
communicates SC activities-related information) from Narasimhan et al. (2013). For trust, we 
adopted and modified the scale of Saparito and Coombs (2013) to measure the suppliers’ 
perception of the level of confidence in and positive expectations regarding Resort XYZ’s 
conduct, motives, and intentions in situations entailing risk. We measure the four variables 
above using a 5-point Likert scale (see Appendix 1).  
17 
 
 The five control variables that can potentially affect the supplier delivery performance 
are firm size, length of partnership, transaction frequency, competitive intensity, and market 
turbulence (Malhotra and Mackelprang, 2012; Milgate, 2001). For firm size, we asked the 
suppliers to indicate the number of employees in their firm (Narasimhan et al., 2013). For the 
length of partnership, we asked the suppliers to indicate the number of years for which they 
have partnered with Resort XYZ (Narasimhan et al., 2013). Log transformation regarding firm 
size and the length of the partnership made it possible to avoid extreme values and account for 
the diminishing marginal effects at the tail end of the distribution. For transaction frequency, 
we asked the supplier to choose one of the following options (9 = more than twice a day, 8 = 
once a day, 7 = 1-5 times a week,  6 = 2-3 times a month,  5 = once a month,  4 = 5-10 times a 
year,  3 = 2-4 times a year, 2 = once a year, and 1 = less than once a year) (Wang et al., 2013). 
From Wang et al. (2013), we adopted and modified the measurement of competitive intensity 
to assess the suppliers’ perceptions regarding the degree of competition in the industry. From 
Stock et al. (2013), we adopted and modified the measurement of market turbulence to assess 
the suppliers’ perceptions regarding the level of instability within the customer preferences. 
We measure competitive intensity and market turbulence using a 5-point Likert scale. 
 The “tourism resort” survey (the SC managers of Resort XYZ’s completed 
questionnaires) assesses the dependent variable – supplier delivery performance. We capture 
the supplier delivery performance (a particular supplier’s delivery time and delivery 
dependability relative to other suppliers’ average performance) using a 5-point Likert scale that 
adopted and modified the measurements of Malhotra and Mackelprang (2012).  
One author and two senior managers of Resort XYZ (constituting the core team leader 
of the field research), who are fluent in both English and the domestic languages, translated the 
questionnaire that contained all of the measurements into the domestic language where the data 
collection took place. To avoid misunderstandings, we then pilot tested the translated 
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questionnaire on staff members and an academic from a local higher education institution. The 
pilot test enabled further revision that led to the final version that the researcher used for the 
primary data collection.  
We adopted a two-step process to collect the data. In step 1, we distributed the supplier 
survey via Resort XYZ to the 504 suppliers (out of the 1,200 in Resort XYZ’s records) who 
had been active in the last five years and possessed a job order at the time of the data collection. 
All 504 suppliers received an introduction letter about our research and a questionnaire, 
followed by a reminder phone call. In the end, 104 suppliers return their responses to us via 
Resort XYZ. After receiving the responses from the suppliers, in step 2, we distributed the 
“tourism resort” survey to Resort XYZ’s SC managers who are responsible for dealing with 
the 104 suppliers who responded to our survey in step 1. We asked Resort XYZ’s SC managers 
to assess the delivery performance of each of the 104 suppliers. In the end, we collected a total 
of 104 responses. After deleting five incomplete questionnaires, we obtained 99 dyadic 
responses, giving an effective response rate of 19.65%. The 99 suppliers in our final sample 
for analysis have an average of 85 employees and a collaborative relationship of 5.99 years 
with Resort XYZ’s SC operations.  
To ensure that non-response bias was not an issue, we adopted two techniques for 
nonresponse bias impact assessment, as suggested by Rogelberg and Stanton (2007). First, we 
performed wave analysis to compare the answers between the early and late respondents and 
found no significant differences between them. Second, we adopted benchmarking analysis to 
compare the means and standard deviations of our key variables (see Figure 1) with other 
similar studies on the supplier-buyer relationship (e.g., Malhotra and Mackelprang, 2012; 
Narasimhan et al., 2013). We found similar distributional characteristics among the scales. 
Both results suggest that non-response bias was not a concern here. 
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Validity and Reliability 
We assessed the validity and reliability of the measurements using the following 
approaches. First, we used a principal component analysis for the factor extraction method with 
a varimax rotation to assess the factor loading (Hair et al., 2010). The results from both the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO = 0.765) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (approx. X2 = 
845.478; df = 105; p < .001) show the sampling adequacy and variance-homogeneity 
acceptability of this study’s factor model. The factor loadings for all of the items are above 
.700 (see Appendix 1), which demonstrates adequate convergent validity. Furthermore, the 
correlations among the five main variables in the model (see Figure 1) are all below .700 (see 
Table 1), which demonstrates adequate discriminant validity. To assess the reliability of the 
constructs, we calculated the Cronbach’s Alpha. The findings show that the value of 
Cronbach’s Alpha is greater than .700, which confirms the construct’s validity and reliability 
(Hair et al., 2010).  
“Insert Table 1” 
Second, the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model with five factors in the 
hypothesized model (see Figure 1) exhibits an adequate fit (X2 = 118.471; df = 67; X2/df = 
1.768; p-value = .001; Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .926; Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation [RMSEA] = .089). Table 1 shows that the value of the composite reliability 
(CR) is greater than 0.70 for all constructs, while the average value extracted (AVE) for all 
constructs exceeded the 0.50 benchmark. The square root value of the AVE for each construct 
shows that the result for each one was greater than all of its correlations with the other 
constructs (see Table 1). All of the results confirm the construct’s reliability (Hair et al., 2010).  
Finally, although the collection of dyadic responses from Resort XYZ and its suppliers 
might reduce the common method bias, the respondents to the questionnaires all worked for a 
single SC ecosystem. Therefore, common method bias might potentially threaten the validity 
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of the results, so we also followed the suggestions of Podsakoff et al. (2003) to guarantee the 
anonymity and confidentiality of the responses, and emphasize to the respondents that there 
were no right or wrong answers. Furthermore, we followed their suggestion to use multiple 
statistical remedies to rule out potential common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). First, 
we performed Harman’s single-factor test by subjecting all of the items in our study to 
exploratory factor analysis, and found that this did not explain the majority of the variance. 
Second, we used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to load all of the items onto a single factor 
in a CFA. We found that the fit statistic does not show a good fit, which indicated that a single 
factor does not account for all of the variances in the data. Both results suggest that common 
method variance is not a concern for this study.  
 
Findings 
Analysis and Results 
Table 2 presents the results of our regression analysis. Hypothesis 1 posits that 
perceived procedural justice has a positive moderating effect and hypothesis 2 posits that 
perceived interactional justice has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between 
shared value and supplier delivery performance, respectively. Following the approach 
suggested by Aiken and West (1991), we estimated a regression model including the main 
effects and both interaction effects. Model 2 shows that the interaction effect of shared value 
and perceived procedural justice on supplier delivery performance is positive and significant 
(Model 2: β = .307, p < .050), whereas the interaction between shared value and perceived 
interactional justice has negative and significant effects on supplier delivery performance 
(Model 2: β = -.292, p < .050). These findings support Hypothesis 1 and do not support 
Hypothesis 2. We present the interaction plots for each moderating effect in Figure 2 (a) and 
(b). 
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“Insert Table 2” 
“Insert Figure 2” 
 To investigate the three-way interaction effect proposed in Hypotheses 3 and 4, we 
again following Aiken and West (1991). We present the three-way interaction plots in Figure 
3. Hypothesis 3 posits that the moderating effect of perceived procedural justice on the shared 
value-supplier delivery performance relationship is stronger when the level of trust within the 
supply chain relationship is high. Model 3 shows that the three-way interaction effect among 
shared value, perceived procedural justice, and trust on supplier delivery performance is 
positive and significant (Model 3: β = .444, p < .010). Thus, this confirms Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 posits that the positive moderating effect of perceived interactional justice on the 
shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship is stronger when the level of trust 
within the supply chain relationship is high. Model 4 shows that the three-way interaction effect 
among shared value, perceived interactional justice, and trust on supplier delivery performance 
is positive and significant (Model 4: β = .588, p < .001). Given our earlier findings regarding 
the negative moderating effects of perceived interactional justice on the shared value-supplier 
delivery performance relationship (Model 2), this result indicates that the negative moderating 
effect of perceived interactional justice on the shared value-supplier delivery performance 
relationship is weaker when higher levels of trust exist within the SC relationship. This is 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Finally, we included both 
three-way interaction effects in a single regression model (Model 5). The results are consistent 
with our original approach to examining the three-way interaction effects independently.  
 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is a common concern in nonexperimental research. We adopt two 
approaches to ensure that endogeneity is not a concern here. First, we rely on a comprehensive 
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set of control variables (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003), including firm size, length of 
partnership, transaction frequency, competitive intensity, and market turbulence, to reduce the 
likelihood of bias.  
Second, we perform additional analyses to address the potential endogeneity concern 
following the procedures of Poppo et al. (2016). We identify shared value, perceived 
procedural justice, perceived interactional justice, trust, length of partnership and transaction 
frequency as likely to be endogenous (Narasimhan et al., 2013; Saparito and Coombs, 2013). 
We then employ a two-stage regression model to correct for potential endogeneity (Hamilton 
and Nickerson, 2003). In stage one, we regress the perceived procedural justice and perceived 
interactional justice, respectively, against shared value, length of partnership and transaction 
frequency to obtain residuals that are free of the influence of these variables. In stage two, we 
used perceived procedural justiceresidual and perceived interactional justiceresidual as the 
indicators of perceived procedural justice and perceived interactional justice to perform the 
regression model to re-test our hypotheses 1 and 2. Our findings show (see Appendix 2) that 
perceived procedural justiceresidual strengthens the shared value-supplier delivery performance 
relationship (Model 6: β = .315, p < .050), while perceived interactional justiceresidual weakens 
it (Model 6: β = -.262, p < .050). These findings are consistent with our earlier results.  
To re-test the three-way interaction hypotheses 3 and 4, we also employ a two-stage 
regression model of Hamilton and Nickerson (2003). In stage one, we regress trust against 
shared value, perceived procedural justice, perceived interactional justice, length of partnership 
and transaction frequency to obtain trustresidual, free of the influence of these variables (Poppo 
et al., 2016). In stage two, we use trustresidual as the indicator of trust to perform three-way 
interaction regression models (see Appendix 2). The findings displayed in Models 7 and 8 are 
also consistent with our earlier results. In general, all of our results suggest that potential 
endogeneity is unlikely to inflate the bias coefficient estimates in our study. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Theoretical Contributions 
 We make two important contributions to the relevant literature. First, prior studies have 
explored different types of mechanisms that a hub-firm adopts to orchestrate its activities 
within the business ecosystem (e.g., Azzam et al., 2017; Pellinen et al., 2012; Rong et al., 2013). 
Although scholars have suggested that SC justice practices are important in facilitating the 
dynamics of the behaviors within firms’ relationships (Griffith et al., 2006; Luo, 2007; 
Narasimhan et al., 2013), no study has attempted to explore the influence of SC justice practices 
among the firms within an SC ecosystem. We address this knowledge gap by investigating how 
suppliers’ perceptions of a hub-firm’s SC justice practices influence the impacts of shared value 
(the critical element for the establishment of a business ecosystem) on supplier delivery 
performance. We show that perceived procedural justice positively affects the relationship 
between shared value and supplier delivery performance, as we have argued.  
Contrary to our prediction, perceived interactional justice negatively affects the 
relationship between shared value and supplier delivery performance. One possible explanation 
for this is that the presence of perceived interactional justice improves the openness of the 
relevant communication among the firms within an SC ecosystem. Although such openness 
enhances the amount of information shared across firms within the SC ecosystem firms, it also 
increases the potential risk of miscommunication (Tuten and Urban, 2001). When a large 
amount of information flows freely within the inter-organizational networks (i.e., an SC 
ecosystem), there exists a high possibility that some parties may misinterpret that information, 
which will lead to miscommunication (Liu et al., 2013; Tuten and Urban, 2001). The 
occurrence of miscommunication may lead an actor-firm (supplier) to question whether others 
intended deliberately to mislead them out of self-interest, which in turn reduces the actor-firms’ 
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desire to engage in interaction activities with both the hub-firm and each other. Fewer and less 
frequent interactions among the firms within the SC ecosystem provide them with fewer 
opportunities to create and maintain shared value. As a result, the beneficial effects of shared 
value on supplier delivery performance will diminish when the actor-firms perceive the 
presence of interactional justice within an SC ecosystem.  
Despite the rejection of Hypothesis 2, our findings still provide important academic 
insights. We show how perceived procedural justice and perceived interactional justice 
differentially affect the relationship between shared value and supplier delivery performance. 
This distinction is important because these two types of SC justice capture two distinct facets 
of the perception of fairness within the SC relationship (Luo, 2007; Narasimhan et al., 2013). 
In doing so, this study provides new insights into the business ecosystem research by 
highlighting the role of different SC justice practices as orchestration mechanisms that a hub-
firm adopts in order to coordinate their SC activities within an SC ecosystem. 
 Second, scholars who explore the influence of justice practices on interpersonal (e.g., 
Colquitt et al., 2012) and inter-organizational (e.g., Jambulingam et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 
2011) relationships have acknowledged the complementary role of “trust” in this setting. 
However, it remains unclear whether trust can help to capitalize the value of SC justice 
practices, while previous studies have acknowledged the important role of trust in facilitating 
the dynamic of firms’ behaviors within a business ecosystem (e.g., Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; 
Liu et al., 2013). Adopting the view that trust plays a contingency role in affecting the value of 
perceived justice practices in interpersonal relationships (Bal et al., 2011; De Cremer and Tyler, 
2007) and applying this insight to this study context, we find that trust acts as a moderator in 
facilitating the impacts of perceived SC justice on the relationship between shared value and 
supplier delivery performance within an SC ecosystem.  
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Yet, we need to revise our arguments about how trust affects the moderating role of 
perceived interactional justice on the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship. 
Our earlier findings show that perceived interaction justice negatively moderates the 
relationship between shared value and supplier delivery performance. A possible revised 
argument is that the presence of interactional justice promotes openness and allows information 
to flow freely within an SC ecosystem, which in turn increases the potential risk of 
miscommunication. The occurrence of miscommunication then can reduce the actor-firms’ 
desire to engage in interaction activities with both the hub-firm and each other. We expect that 
this challenge will be eased when the level of trust within the SC relationship is high. When 
the trust level is high, the actor-firms (suppliers) tend to interpret such miscommunications as 
unfortunate events rather than as deliberate intentions by other firms to mislead them due to 
self-interest (Beritelli, 2011; Czakon and Czernek, 2016). As a result, the actor-firms will 
continue to interact with both the hub-firm and each other, which in turn leads to the 
development of shared value within an SC ecosystem. Thus, the harmful effect of perceived 
interaction justice on the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship will be 
suppressed when the level of trust is high. On the other hand, when the level of trust is low, 
actor-firms are more likely to interpret miscommunication as other firms’ deliberate action and 
take retaliatory action in response to this. Consequently, the actor-firms become less likely to 
engage in interaction activities with both the hub-firm and each other. Such actions will destroy 
the shared value within the SC ecosystem, enhance the harmful effect of perceived interactional 
justice, and so weaken the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship. 
 Nonetheless, both of our original arguments lead to the development of Hypotheses 3 
and 4 and the revised arguments above are built on the theoretical logic that trust affects 
suppliers’ perceptions of the intentions of other firms’ actions (Bal et al., 2011; De Cremer and 
Tyler, 2007). When a high level of trust exists within an SC ecosystem, suppliers tend to 
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attribute unfair treatment to unfortunate circumstances rather than to the deliberate intention of 
others. Our theoretical logic and empirical findings confirm our arguments. This study 
represents an initial attempt to assess how the role of perceived SC justice in inter-
organizational relationships within the SC ecosystem depends on trust. In doing so, we shed 
new light on the role of trust in governing the dynamics of firms’ behaviors within a business 
ecosystem. 
  
Managerial Implications 
Our findings and context provide important implications for practitioners. First, the 
managers of hub-firms must distinguish between procedural justice practices and interactional 
justice practices. Conventional wisdom states that the engagement of both types of SC justice 
practice should yield positive benefits within the SC relationship (Luo, 2007; Narasimhan et 
al., 2013). However, our findings suggest that, in the context of an SC ecosystem, shared value 
that is in line with perceived procedural justice will have a positive impact on supplier delivery 
performance. However, when the shared value is in line with the perceived interactional justice, 
this may have a negative impact on the supplier delivery performance. Therefore, the managers 
of the hub-firms should pay attention to the type of SC justice practices that they adopt in order 
to orchestrate their SC activities. According to the results of our study, we recommend that the 
hub-firm managers should always adopt procedural justice practices as their orchestration 
mechanism for coordinating the SC activities within the hub-firm SC ecosystem. Moreover, 
the actor firm (supplier) managers within an SC ecosystem also need to be aware of the negative 
influence of interactional justice practice on the operation of the SC ecosystem. When they 
suspect that a hub-firm is adopting this type of SC justice practice, the actor-firm managers 
should inform the hub-firm managers of their opposition to this as well as engage in more 
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network activities with the hub-firm and other actor-firms to enhance the shared value within 
the SC ecosystem in order to prevent any potential harmful effects of such SC justice practices. 
 Second, both the hub-firm and actor-firm (supplier) managers should recognize the 
important role of trust in facilitating collaborative behaviors within the SC ecosystem.  Our 
findings suggest that, when interacting with shared value and different types of perceived SC 
justice, the presence of trust can enhance the positive aspect of perceived SC justice, which 
may amplify the strength of the shared value-supplier delivery performance relationship, as 
well as neutralize any negative aspects of perceived SC justice that may suppress such a 
relationship. Thus, we recommend that both the hub-firm and actor-firm managers should 
continuously make a substantial investment in developing and maintaining the trust within an 
SC ecosystem.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
First, our research design may restrict us from drawing any definite conclusions about 
the causation effect among the variables over time. Researchers in the future might employ a 
longitudinal research design in order to confirm this causality empirically. Second, a tourism 
resort SC ecosystem in Indonesia was the ideal context in which to explore our research topic, 
but we must acknowledge that the generalizability of our findings remains limited to firms 
within a single industry and country context. Future studies on different industries and 
countries would help to generalize our findings and expand the boundary conditions.  
Third, we use two-item measurement to assess two of our main variables (shared value 
and supplier delivery performance), which is fewer than the “just-identified” three-item 
measurement that various researchers suggest (Hair et al., 2010). Because 1) the original 
research by Saparito and Coombs (2013) and Malhotra and Mackelprang (2012), used these 
two items measurements, and 2) our pilot study shows that managers favor completing short 
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surveys over long ones. Nevertheless, future research should develop three-item measurement 
for these two variables to provide adequate identification for the construct. Fourth, although 
we addressed and attempted to control the potential endogeneity concern in the post-hoc 
analysis, we cannot remove this issue completely. Future researchers might adopt a randomized 
experimental method to counteract this limitation (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).  
Fifth, our current research setting only allows us to perform two (out of the nine) 
recommended techniques for nonresponse bias impact assessment (Rogelberg and Stanton, 
2007). Because some techniques involve conducting pre-survey focus groups/interviews or 
additional questions in the survey design. Future research might consider employing these 
techniques to ensure that non-response bias is not a concern for this type of supplier-buyer 
relationship study. Sixth, this study suffers from having a relatively small sample size because 
of using pair-matched datasets (99 pair-matched cases) compared to other single response 
research that investigates inter-organizational relationships (e.g., Griffith et al., 2006; 
Narasimhan et al., 2013). The use of a pair-matched dataset allowed us to reduce the risk of 
common method bias, as well as provide a more accurate assessment of the variables (Kenny 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, unlike the typical dyadic datasets in operations management studies 
that collect pair-matched responses from both the buyer and seller without considering the 
relationship among different buyers and sellers in the sample (e.g., Liu et al., 2012), we survey 
firms within a single business ecosystem. This approach allow us to capture a more realistic 
view on the dynamics of suppliers’ behaviors and interactions of a hub-firm and the actor-firms 
within an SC ecosystem. Nevertheless, future research should attempt to collect a larger 
number of match-paired surveys (e.g., multiple SC ecosystems) to overcome this limitation.  
Finally, our findings also reveal other future research opportunities. For example, 
researchers in the future might explore both the actor-firms and hub-firm’s perspectives 
regarding justice practices. This suggestion also applies to other variables, such as shared value, 
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trust, and delivery performance. A comparison of both the actor-firm and hub-firm’s answers 
to these questions may increase the value and contribution of the study. Furthermore, building 
on our research results, future research can exam other SC relationship influential factors (e.g., 
network governance (Song et al., 2013), etc.) that may also influence the shared value-supplier 
delivery performance relationship.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Firm Size ---          
2. Length of partnership .383** ---         
3. Transaction frequency -.103 .117 ---        
4. Competitive Intensity -.094 -.118 .190 ---       
5. Market Turbulence -.127 -.122 .206* .452** ---      
6. Trust -.053 -.053 -.034 .051 .070 .763     
7. Shared Value -.148 -.022 -.010 .008 .084 .391** .871    
8. Perceived Procedural Justice -.079 -.063 -.006 .109 .027 .439** .225* .812   
9. Perceived Interactional Justice -.167 -.119 -.009 -.035 .017 .355** .315** .495** .820  
10. Supplier Delivery Performance .022 -.064 .042 -.092 -.043 .222* .274** .111 .111 .854 
           
Mean 2.498 1.265 3.495 3.579 3.242 4.115 3.510 4.263 4.058 3.902 
Standard Deviation .990 1.017 1.843 .678 .747 .526 .805 .531 .501 .591 
Notes: 
N = 99; *p < .05; **p < .01 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) square roots are shown in bold on the correlation matrix diagonal 
Firm Size is measured as log (employee numbers in 2017). 
Length of partnership is measured as log (years business with company x). 
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Table 2. Regression Results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Covariates and Main Effects      
Firm Size .030(.305) .027(.276) -.004(-.046) -.008(-.083) -.031(-.343) 
Length of partnership -.105(-1.040) -.093(-.922) -.105(-1.065) -.108(-1.123) -.086(-.928) 
Transaction frequency .135(1.320) .152(1.502) .068(.674) .124(1.283) .093(1.002) 
Competitive Intensity -.076(-.682) -.100(-.891) -.086(-.787) -.074(-.695) -.083(-.835) 
Market Turbulence -.105(-.927) -.065(-.575) -.104(-.948) -.021(-.197) -.012(-.114) 
Shared Value .280(2.829)** .182(1.575) .192(1.592) .147(1.278) .022(.187) 
Perceived Procedural Justice  .032(.281) -.060(-.492) -.023(-.204) -.090(-.763) 
Perceived Interactional Justice  .011(.094) -.101(-.848) -.264(-2.051)* -.194(-1.541) 
Trust   .032(.278) .096(.867) .049(.462) 
      
Two-way Interaction Terms      
Shared Value x Perceived Procedural Justice  .307(2.269)* .090(.714)  .300(2.194)* 
Shared Value x Perceived Interactional Justice  -.292(-2.346)*  -.459(-2.925)** -.601(-3.750)*** 
Shared Value x Trust   -.256(-2.071)* .065(.571) -.092(-.759) 
Perceived Procedural Justice x Trust   .055(.465)  .127(.952) 
Perceived Interactional Justice x Trust    -.064(-.559) -.079(-.564) 
      
Three-way Interaction Terms      
Shared Value x Perceived Procedural Justice x Trust   .444(3.337)**  .294(2.007)* 
Shared Value x Perceived Interactional Justice x Trust    .588(3.879)*** .489(2.944)** 
      
Model Statistics       
F-Value 1.884† 1.886† 2.152* 2.627** 3.292*** 
P-Value .084 .058 .019 .004 .000 
R-Square .109 .117 .248 .287 .391 
Notes:  
*** p < .001; ** p < .010; * p < .050; † p < .100 
Standardized Coefficients are reported with t-value in parentheses. 
Outcome Variable = Supplier Delivery Performance. 
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Figure 2. Graphical Representation: Two-way Interaction Plot 
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Figure 3. Graphical Representation: Three-Way Interaction Plot 
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Appendix 1: Measurement Loading, Validity, and Reliability 
 
Measurements Loading 
Questionnaires completed by Company XYZ’s suppliers  
Shared Value (α = .707; CR = .848; AVE = .761)  
We share common business values with firms in our supply chain. .736 
We feel that firms in our supply chain would act in a fashion consistent with what we would recommend without prior discussion with us. .900 
Perceived Procedural Justice (α = .847; CR = .851; AVE = .660)  
“Resort XYZ” is fair in their dealings with us.  .837 
“Resort XYZ” fully explained the decision-making criteria to us. .833 
“Resort XYZ” applied consistent decision-making criteria when dealing with us. .803 
Perceived Interactional Justice (α = .872; CR = .890; AVE =.673)  
We agree on what is important in this engagement. .852 
We quickly resolve any disagreement. .881 
We exchange information in a timely manner. .863 
We keep each other informed of any changes that may affect the other party. .704 
Trust (α = .782; CR = .803; AVE = .583)  
Firms in our supply chain are honest in their dealings with us. .775 
We can trust firms in our supply chain. .819 
If the firms in our supply chain made a decision that was different from what we would make, we would believe that they had good reasons for making this 
decision. 
.737 
Questionnaires completed by Company XYZ  
Supplier Delivery Performance (α = .793; CR = .794, AVE = .659)  
Delivery time  .903 
Delivery dependability .890 
Notes: 
--- Items deleted due to low factor loading 
α = Cronbach’s Alpha; CR = Composite Reliability, AVE = Average Variance Extracted 
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Appendix 2. Post-Hoc Analysis 
 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Covariates and Main Effects    
Firm Size .026(.259) -.011(-.112) .012(.123) 
Length of partnership -.095(-.953) -.127(-1.253) -.122(-1.224) 
Transaction frequency .151(1.497) .106(1.031) .125(1.250) 
Competitive Intensity -.102(-.915) -.098(-.877) -.065(-.599) 
Market Turbulence -.067(-.595) -.135(-1.216) -.062(-.560) 
Shared Value .186(1.735)† .185(1.513) .302(2.686)** 
Perceived Procedural Justice residual .031(.271)   
Perceived Interactional Justice residual .013(.113)   
Perceived Procedural Justice  .004(.035) -.002(-.015) 
Perceived Interactional Justice  -.012(-.096) -.031(-.258) 
Trust residuals  .060(.561) .089(.854) 
    
Two-way Interaction Terms    
Shared Value x Perceived Procedural Justice residual .315(2.399)*   
Shared Value x Perceived Interactional Justice residual -.262(-2.163)*   
Shared Value x Perceived Procedural Justice  .086(.778)  
Shared Value x Perceived Interactional Justice   -.313(-2.683)** 
Shared Value x Trust residual  -.011(-.097) .114(.986) 
Perceived Procedural Justice x Trust residual  .065(.593)  
Perceived Interactional Justice x Trust residual   -.024(-.223) 
    
Three-way Interaction Terms    
Shared Value x Perceived Procedural Justice x Trust residual  .319(2.838)**  
Shared Value x Perceived Interactional Justice x Trust residual   .386(3.218)** 
    
Model Statistics     
F-Value 1.890† 1.773† 2.144* 
P-Value .057 .061 .019 
R-Square .177 .213 .247 
Notes:  
*** p < .001; ** p < .010; * p < .050; † p < .100 
Standardized Coefficients are reported with t-value in parentheses. 
Outcome Variable = Perceived Delivery Performance. 
 
